Elections in the Arab World

Abstract

This article examines the determinants of voting in competitive authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. In contrast to scholars who view elections in the Arab World purely as patronage contests, we argue that citizens also care about policy outputs and use turnout as a way to signal their approval or disapproval with the regime. We draw on the literature on economic voting in democratic regimes to develop an argument about economic voting under authoritarian conditions, and we propose a mediation model to get at the mechanisms of economic voting. We test our argument with original data based on surveys conducted in seven Arab countries between 2006 and 2009. Our results show that although patronage helps to explain turnout, especially among high-income citizens, policy outcomes are also important in the calculus of voting. Most voters turn out to vote to show approval of the regime and its economic performance.

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