Abstract This essay provides an analysis of the role of affectivity in Martin Heidegger's writings from the mid to late 1920s. We begin by situating his account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time . We then discuss the role of Befindlichkeit (often translated as ‘attunement’ or ‘disposition’) and Stimmung (‘mood’) in his account of human existence, explicate the relationship between the former and the latter, and consider the ways in which the former discloses the world. To give a more vivid and comprehensive picture of Heidegger's account of mood, we focus on the experience of anxiety ( Angst ) by articulating both its function within fundamental ontology and, relatedly, its revelatory nature. We conclude by considering the place of emotions in Heidegger's thinking from this period. In a companion essay, ‘Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and Beyond’, we complement our present analysis by revisiting the issue of affectivity in terms of Heidegger's discussion of temporality in Division II of Being and Time . We also expand our present discussion by considering the fundamental mood of boredom and other specific moods that Heidegger considers within his later thinking.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 65 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.