References

• 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
• 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
• 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
• 2002The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics1,006 cited
• n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
• 2005The New York City High School Match655 cited
• 2007Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets580 cited
• 2005The Boston Public School Match531 cited
• 2009Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match500 cited
• 2008What Have We Learned from Market Design?402 cited
• 2007Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions394 cited
• 2008Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions372 cited
• 1997Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists205 cited
• 2003Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match161 cited