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We analyze three explanations of candidate choice in presidential nomination campaigns: (1) a preference model, which contends that nomination choice is based on the ideological, issue, or candidate preferences of the voter; (2) a candidate-chances explanation that argues choice is motivated by the chances candidates have of winning the nomination or the general election; and (3) an expected utility model that includes both preferences and candidate chances by discounting ideological, issue, and candidate-trait preferences by the perceived chances each candidate has of winning in November. We test these explanations on samples of Democratic caucus attenders and state convention delegates from Iowa in 1984. The expected utility model most successfully predicts candidate choice in both samples. Even with appropriate controls for candidate affect, both preference and candidate chances measures have significant independent effects on candidate choice. Our analysis suggests that the interests of individual nomination participants and party organizations may not be as disparate as many critics of the contemporary process believe.
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