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Are IOs accountable to their member states? There are good reasons to think that they may not be. We extend and apply agency theory to account for divergence between member-country environmental preferences and lending behavior at the multilateral development banks (MDBs). We treat governments in international organizations as members of a collective principal, an understudied concept in political science. A collective principal must overcome collective-action problems before and while delegating. If voting rules within MDBs are efficacious, then MDB behavior will be responsive to changes in the preferences of the winning coalition on the MDB board. We address such claims theoretically and statistically with a sample of more than 7,500 loans
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 7 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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