References

• 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
• 1984Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have18,936 cited
• 2021Econometric Analysis of Panel Data15,089 cited
• 1977Determinants of corporate borrowing13,160 cited
• 2002Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties12,832 cited
• 1995What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data6,527 cited
• 1963CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AND THE COST OF CAPITAL: A CORRECTION5,951 cited
• 2005Law, finance, and economic growth in China4,481 cited
• 2002Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings3,845 cited
• 2001From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization3,555 cited
• 1999Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance2,502 cited
• 2007Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive Than Non-Family Firms?2,060 cited
• 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
• 1999Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure1This paper has benefited from comments by seminar participants at Boston College, Boston Unsiversity, Dartmouth College, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Massachusetts, Ohio State University, University of California at Los Angeles and the NBER, especially Eugene Fama and Robert Gertner. The usual disclaimers apply. Funding from MIT and the Tuck School at Dartmouth College is gratefuly acknowledged. We also thank two reviewers, Richard S. Ruback and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., for helpful comments.1