Most people find it irritatingly childish to wonder whether there is anything wrong if a lifeguard who can save several people drowning to his right lets them drown in order to save one person drowning on his left, even though saving the several would have been as easy as, and no more risky than saving the one, and he knew that, and knew that he could not save them all, and that he has no special obligation to any of them. Surely, we say, numbers matter. Surely the lifeguard would wrong not to attempt to save as many as he can. In exploring the general features of practical reason such cases are challenging. The more obvious the answer the more difficult it is to find non-question-begging reasons for it. Besides not every-one shares the common certitude. Some feel that it is up to the lifeguard, or at least would be up to him if his employment does not impose any special obligations, for example an obligation to save as many people as he can. We will ignore such complications, assuming only that the rescuer has a moral reason to save at least one of the drowning, and that there is no reason to favour or dis-favour any of them. I will take the fundamental practical concept to be that of a reason for action, i.e. of a consideration which makes the action eligible such that if it is performed for that reason it is, other things being equal, an intelligible action (it makes sense to the agent and to others who know of its circumstances) and a rational, justified action, one which is not flawed. If, in other words, the action is irrational or unjustified this is because of other factors which negate or defeat the factors which are reasons for it.2 I will
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 59 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.