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How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important? · Study

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PreprintHow Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?

Julapa A. Jagtiani2010

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Preprintgreen2010

How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?

Julapa A. Jagtiani · Elijah Brewer

35 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Corporate Finance and Governance Global Financial Regulation and Crises

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References

2008Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches 2006Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches 1988Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms 2006Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies 1996Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983- 1991 2001Where do merger gains come from? Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders 1990Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail"2004Too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts

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2019Bank size, returns to scale, and cost efficiency

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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

2011How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?article · 16 shared references 2007How Much Would Banks Be Willing to Pay to Become 'Too-Big-to-Fail' and to Capture Other Benefitspreprint · 15 shared references 2011The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guaranteespreprint · 8 shared references 2014‘Too systemically important to fail’ in banking – Evidence from bank mergers and acquisitionsarticle · 8 shared references 2009Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese bankingarticle · 7 shared references 2011Systemic risks and the 'too-big-to-fail' problem'article · 7 shared references

Details

Year2010

Typepreprint

Published2010-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations35

Files0 public / 0

ShelfBanking stability, regulation, efficiency

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doi10.2139/ssrn.1548105

openalex_workW2134800364

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