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On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
16 references·9 citing·25 second hop
On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (2005)On two competing mechanisms for priority-…Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics (2006)Social Choice, Welfare, and E…School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice: A Mechanism De…Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities (2002)Efficient Resource Allocation…A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (2001)A New Solution to the Random …Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange (2000)Strategyproof Assignment by H…House Allocation with Existing Tenants (1999)House Allocation with Existin…A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Stu…Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems (1998)Random Serial Dictatorship an…Game theory and applications (1994)Game theory and applicationsTwo-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingMachiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods (1977)Weak versus strong domination…On cores and indivisibility (1974)On cores and indivisibilityOn Cores and Indivisibility (1973)On Cores and IndivisibilityCollege Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (2018)Efficiency and Stability in L…What Really Matters in Designing School Choice Mechanisms (2017)What Really Matters in Design…Improving matching under hard distributional constraints (2017)Improving matching under hard…Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach (2016)Improving schools through sch…A theory of school-choice lotteries (2015)A theory of school-choice lot…The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2013)The “Boston” school-choice me…The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects (2012)The difference indifference m…An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (2012)An alternative characterizati…On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (2011)On two kinds of manipulation …Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)The Handbook of experimental economics (1995)Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009)The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare (2016)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)61. Capitalism and Freedom (2002)Matching with Contracts (2005)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)The assignment game I: The core (1971)The Boston Public School Match (2005)The Theory of Linear Economic Models (1962)Core in a simple coalition formation game (2001)A limit theorem on the core of an economy (2008)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)
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References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1974On cores and indivisibility1,254 cited
  • 2001A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem732 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 1998Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems612 cited
  • 1973On Cores and Indivisibility584 cited
  • 1999A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement567 cited
  • 1999House Allocation with Existing Tenants450 cited
  • 1977Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods378 cited
  • 2000Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange353 cited
  • 2002Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities279 cited
  • 2006Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics166 cited
  • 1994Game theory and applications152 cited

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  • 2017What Really Matters in Designing School Choice Mechanisms102 cited
  • 2017Improving matching under hard distributional constraints97 cited
  • 2013The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach91 cited
  • 2015A theory of school-choice lotteries85 cited
  • 2012The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects82 cited
  • 2011On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems74 cited
  • 2016Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach74 cited
  • 2018Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets62 cited
  • 2012An alternative characterization of top trading cycles61 cited