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Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors? · Study

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ArticleDo central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?

Jeroen Klomp2009

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Articlegreen2009

Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?

Jeroen Klomp · Jakob de Haan

17 citations·0/0 files stored·Economics Letters

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Judicial and Constitutional Studies

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References

2005Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses 2001New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence 2008Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future 1995Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence 2008When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence 2008INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2008Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set

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2012Monetary targeting and financial system characteristics : An empirical analysis 2016The Politics of Central Bank Independence 2011When are Central Bankers Removed?

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Year2009

Typearticle

Published2009-12-17

VenueEconomics Letters

ISSN-L0165-1765

Languageen

Citations17

Files0 public / 0

ShelfMonetary Policy and Economic Impact

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doi10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.004

openalex_workW2136244048

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