Education, Matching, and the Allocative Value of Romance

Alison L. Booth · Melvyn Coles

14 citations0/0 files storedJournal of the European Economic Association

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms—one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. Whereas marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency, romantic matching, by increasing the number of educated and talented women who participate in the labour market, increases aggregate productivity.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 14 citations exist upstream.

References

1991A Treatise on the Family 1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model 1971A model of price adjustment 1869FROM The Subjection of Women 2006The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap 1993Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings 2000Assortative Matching and Search 1992Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth

Cited by

2009Tax policy and returns to education

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.