Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt RenegotiationsDavid M. Benjamin, Mark L. J. Wright2009-01-01preprintSSRN Electronic Journal274 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Global Financial Crisis and PoliciesCorporate Insolvency and GovernanceFiscal Policies and Political EconomyAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 274 citations exist upstream.References1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model1981Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis2002On Adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott Filter for the Frequency of Observations1989Bargaining in Legislatures1996Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors2007Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies1986A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt2005Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current accountCited by2016SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS: PREEMPTIVE OR POST-DEFAULT2018International Reserves and Rollover Risk2013Collectivism and corruption in bank lending2015SOVEREIGN DEBT RELIEF AND ITS AFTERMATH2011Financial integration and international risk sharing2013Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default2012Default risk and risk averse international investors2016Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk