Beyond Rationality in Models of Choice

Abstract

There is increasing sociological interest in formal models of action driven by a calculus of expected utility. We believe these efforts to extend microeconomic models to extraeconomic exchange can benefit from specification of societal constraints on individual choice. One type of constraint locates the actor in an evolving network of social ties that limit opportunities for exchange. Another approach assumes that choices are influenced by unintended outcomes that operate behind the backs of the actors. Considerable progress has been made in the past two years incorporating social structure and unintended consequences into formal models based on individual choice optimization. We critically examine leading contributions to network exchange theory (part 1) and evolutionary models of collective action (part 2), and assess how these and related developments may shape the future of rational choice theory and its place within sociology.

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