Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

Thomas Romer · Howard L. Rosenthal

577 citations0/0 files storedThe Quarterly Journal of Economics

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Political Theory and Democracy Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

I. The setter's problem under certainty and the importance of the reversion point, 565.—II. Budget-maximizing with uncertain turnout, 571.—III. Exploiting a sequence of elections, 579.—IV. Implications for empirical research, 581.—Appendix, 585.

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1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government 1943The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources

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2001The Invisible Hand of Democracy 1990Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy 1995Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years 2002The Political Economy of Transition 2004DIRECT DEMOCRACY: New Approaches to Old Questions 2003Innovation in Education Markets: Theory and Evidence on the Impact of Competition and Choice in Charter Schools 2005Direct Democracy Works 1996Public Provision of Private Goods

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