Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade Policy

N. Gregory Mankiw · Phillip L. Swagel

48 citations0/0 files storedForeign Affairs

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Global trade and economics World Trade Organization Law COVID-19, Geopolitics, Technology, Migration

Abstract

Although few U.S. politicians will admit it, antidumping policy has strayed far from its original purpose of guarding against predatory foreign firms. It is now little more than an excuse for a few powerful industries to shield themselves from competition -- at great cost to both American consumers and American business.

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