MULTIPLE‐PRIZE CONTESTS – THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES

Dana Sisak

96 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Economic Surveys

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Abstract Multiple‐prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics, patent and R&D races to tendering for (governmental) projects. Hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment. This survey attempts to outline, compare and evaluate the results from the literature. While a first prize always results in a positive incentive to invest effort, second and later prizes lead to ambiguous effects. Depending on the objective function, the characteristics of the individuals and the type of contest a different prize allocation is optimal.

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References

1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts 1967THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, AND THEFT 2001Efficient Rent Seeking 1989POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*2008The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft 2001The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 1979Auctions of Shares

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2018Beyond the Last Touch: Attribution in Online Advertising 2017Tournament group identity and performance: The moderating effect of winner proportion 2014Optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests: Theory and experimental evidence 2016Tournament Winner Proportion and its Effect on Effort: An Investigation of the Underlying Psychological Mechanisms

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