Interpretive Economy, Schelling Points, and evolutionary stability ∗

Christopher Potts

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Economic Theory and Institutions Philosophy and History of Science Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract I attempt to show that Kennedy’s (2007) Interpretive Economy principle follows from basic assumptions about cognitive prominence and evolutionary stability.

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References

1960The Strategy of Conflict 1978Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics 2007Vagueness and grammar: the semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives 2003Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games 2002SCALE STRUCTURE AND THE SEMANTIC TYPOLOGY OF GRADABLE PREDICATES 2007Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study 2006Game Theory and Pragmatics 2006An Introduction to Game Theory for Linguists

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2019Epistemicism and the Sorites Paradox

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