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Abstract This paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behavior relating to earnings management. Economics theory identifies two apparently conflicting effects of managerial ownership on managers' incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. We construct a theoretical model demonstrating the two effects. This model suggests that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management decreases for both high and low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for intermediate levels of managerial ownership if the sensitivity of the probability of managerial dismissal to the corporate performance is high enough and/or the manager's private benefit derived from managerial position is high enough. In a sample of Japanese firms, we find a significant nonmonotonic relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals, consistent with our model.
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