Mind knowledge in infancy: The emergence of intentional communication

Abstract

Abstract When and how infants and young children start to understand that persons are entities different from ‘non‐persons ’ is the central issue addressed in this paper. A critical examination is presented of empirical research inspired by the ‘theory of mind ’ approach and relative to the knowledge about the mind exhibited by pre‐school children (2–5 years of age). In considering what kind of psychological knowledge pre‐linguistic children may acquire, it is argued that the most significant developmental phenomenon is the grasp of the concept of intentional communication, as distinct from both agency and instrumentality. Intentional communication, so defined, implies the capacity to represent and influence the other person's attentional state about aspects of the world, and at the same time to represent the other person as capable of understanding one's communicative intentions.

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