BRITISH ‘WAR CABINETS’ IN LIMITED WARS: KOREA, SUEZ AND THE FALKLANDS

Abstract

In crises leading to a limited war, the Cabinet assigns responsibility for its detailed management to a ‘War Cabinet’. For Korea the standing Defence Committee was used; the Cabinet's role was effectively limited to parliamentary and public relations. Smaller, ad hoc committees were used in the Suez and Falklands crises. At times of greatest pressure the Cabinet in each case had the formal opportunity to take major decisions; but in practice, especially during Suez, this amounted to an opportunity for a veto which was unlikely to be used. Two dangers facing a War Cabinet are those of tunnel vision and of the undue influence of military or technical considerations. The full Cabinet, best suited in principle to relate the problems of the war to the Government's other problems and goals, risks finding itself flanked by a War Cabinet too close to the war and by a Parliament which is too far away and too excitable.

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