Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries

Abstract

Abstract Government formation is guided by several principles such as majority, plurality and electoral gain. According to the principle of electoral gain, parties that increase their share of seats in the elections should form the government, with parties that lose seats joining the opposition. We analyse conformity with this principle in 15 West European countries with multiparty coalition governments between 1945 and 1999. With the exception of the largest party, electoral performance is a rather poor predictor of getting into government. The results show interesting variation between countries, with the loss of seats increasing the probability of entering government in Austria, Germany, Spain and Italy. High electoral volatility is positively related to the degree to which the electoral gain principle applies, but there was no association between this principle and party system fragmentation or aggregation. Prime ministers come more often from parties that are big winners, but winning does not explain the probability of becoming a coalition partner – if a party wants to be a coalition partner, then avoiding the loss of seats is more important.

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