The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Cost of Equity: Empirical Evidence from Pakistani Listed Companies

2009-01-01articleThe Lahore journal of economics57 citationsbronze

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Corporate Finance and Governance Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

This study examines the impact of the quality of corporate governance, as measured by a specially constructed corporate governance index, on the expected cost of equity calculated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) approach. A total of 114 listed companies were investigated to analyze the relationship between the two variables for the period 2003 to 2007. The quality of corporate governance was measured by assigning weights to a set of related variables, although these variables were also considered individually. We used descriptive statistics, a correlation matrix, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) approach, and fixed effect model to test the panel data collected. We found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and board size with the cost of equity, and a positive relationship between board independence, audit committee independence, and corporate governance with the cost of equity. These results could be due to the transition phase through which Pakistani companies are passing after the promulgation of the Code of Corporate Governance in 2002.

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References

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