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ArticleStrong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

Pavithra Harsha2009

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Articlegreen2009

Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

Pavithra Harsha · Cynthia Barnhart · David C. Parkes · Haoqi Zhang

33 citations·0/0 files stored·Computers & Operations Research

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

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References

1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions 2003Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 1967The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data 2014Combinatorial Auctions 2005Combinatorial Auctions 2002Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions 2004An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

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Year2009

Typearticle

Published2009-09-19

VenueComputers & Operations Research

ISSN-L0305-0548

Languageen

Citations33

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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doi10.1016/j.cor.2009.09.003

openalex_workW2139217167

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