Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements

Abstract

The argument that democracies are less belligerent toward one another because of their experience with mediation, negotiation, and compromise at the domestic level suggests that negotiated dispute settlements are more likely between relatively democratic states than other conflicting pairs. Militarized Interstate Dispute data and Polity IIId and Freedom House ratings of democracy are used to examine the propensities of disputants to resolve their grievances through negotiated means. Findings suggest a strong positive influence for mutual democracy. Specifically, the more democratic the less democratic member of a conflictual dyad, the more likely it is their dispute will be resolved through a negotiated settlement. This finding also holds across varying degrees of dyadic relative power and supports existing literature that chronicles the pacific conditioning power of democratic norms for several areas of interstate relations.

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