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Credulity, lies, and costly talk
16 references·3 citing·45 second hop
Credulity, lies, and costly talk (2006)Credulity, lies, and costly talkNaive audience and communication bias (2006)Naive audience and communicat…Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell‐Side Analysts (2005)Trade Generation, Reputation,…Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games (2005)Overcommunication in strategi…Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions (2003)Lying for Strategic Advantage…Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle (2003)Bequests as Signals: An Expla…An Analysis of Stock Recommendations (2003)An Analysis of Stock Recommen…Rationality and Analysts' Forecast Bias (2001)Rationality and Analysts' For…Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations (1999)Conflict of Interest and the …An Analysis of Stock Recommendations (1999)An Analysis of Stock Recommen…An experimental study of strategic information transmission (1995)An experimental study of stra…Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games (1993)Meaning and Credibility in Ch…Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility (1992)Using Privileged Information …Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium (1991)Perfect Bayesian equilibrium …Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types (1987)Incentive Compatibility in Si…A Theory of Credibility (1985)A Theory of CredibilityStrategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…Communication with Detectable Deceit (2018)Communication with Detectable…The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment (2014)The role of ex post transpare…Signaling Games (2011)Signaling GamesOn the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets (1980)Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading (1985)Synchronization risk and delayed arbitrage (2002)Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices (2008)Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? (2009)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Can We Trust Social Capital? (2002)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Sequential Equilibria (1982)Credulity, lies, and costly talk ∗ (2006)Dynamic psychological games (2008)The evolution of overconfidence (2011)Misplaced Confidences (2012)Relatedness and technological change in cities: the rise and fall of technological knowledge in US metropolitan areas from 1981 to 2010 (2014)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995)A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games (2004)Reputational cheap talk (2006)An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender–receiver game (2007)An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation (2011)Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market (1989)Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures (1993)Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations (1998)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment (2002)Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (2004)The Long‐Run Performance of initial Public Offerings (1991)Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking (1993)Earnings Management and the Long‐Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings (1998)Herd Behavior in Financial Markets (2000)Stock price reaction to news and no-news: drift and reversal after headlines (2003)Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value? (2004)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Job Market Signaling (1973)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)What Drives Sell-Side Analyst Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks? (2011)Air pollution, affect, and forecasting bias: Evidence from Chinese financial analysts (2019)Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation (2003)Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications (2013)Evolution of the Social Contract (2014)
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References

  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1999Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations1,549 cited
  • 2001Rationality and Analysts' Forecast Bias1,012 cited
  • 2005Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell‐Side Analysts714 cited
  • 1991Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium647 cited
  • 1992Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility568 cited
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  • 1993Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games508 cited
  • 2003Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions392 cited
  • 2005Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games370 cited
  • 2003An Analysis of Stock Recommendations288 cited
  • 1987Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types273 cited
  • 1995An experimental study of strategic information transmission201 cited
  • 2003Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle147 cited
  • 2006Naive audience and communication bias81 cited
  • 1999

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An Analysis of Stock Recommendations
68 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Communication with Detectable Deceit27 cited
  • 2011Signaling Games25 cited
  • 2014The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment12 cited