Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms

Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature.

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