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The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders: Evidence from Dual Class Stock Unifications

12 references·1 citing·39 second hopsampled

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References

1988One share-one vote and the market for corporate control1,342 cited
1989Private benefits from control of public corporations1,168 cited
1994The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience969 cited
1988Corporate governance670 cited
1985Managerial ownership of voting rights659 cited
1995What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?598 cited
1983The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations359 cited
1998Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders354 cited
1987One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control334 cited
1990Ownership of equity in dual-class firms153 cited
2001Dual class firms: Capitalization, ownership structure and recapitalization back into single class112 cited
2002The source of value of voting rights and related dividend promises44 cited

Cited by

2004Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Companies in the United States35 cited

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