Can Consequentialism Cover Everything?

Bart Streumer

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Political Philosophy and Ethics Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.

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198611. Reasons and Persons 1973Utilitarianism 2003Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality (1984)1975Utilitarianism: For and Against.1981A Theory of the Good and the Right 1993A companion to ethics 1976Motive Utilitarianism 1971Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?

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2014Subjective theories of well-being 2014Utilitarianism and fairness 2014Utilitarianism before Bentham 2016Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War 2006Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict 2013Combinative consequentialism and the problem of act versions 2014What virtue ethics can learn from utilitarianism

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