Monotone Preferences over Information

Juan Dubra · Federico Echenique

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

Abstract We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.

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1960Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience 1962Knowledge and belief 2001Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings 1989Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty 2008Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function 2018Notes On The Theory Of Choice 2010Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior 1974Risk, stochastic preference, and the value of information

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