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Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

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2008An Improved Randomized Truthful Mechanism for Scheduling Unrelated Machines39 cited
2009Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions35 cited