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Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*
16 references·16 citing·34 second hopsampled
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013)Matching with Couples: Stability and Ince…The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)The Combinatorial Assignment …What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)What Have We Learned from Mar…Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred Acceptance Algorithm…Matching with Contracts (2005)Matching with ContractsPutting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Putting Auction Theory to WorkSchool Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice: A Mechanism De…Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College Educated, 1940-1990 (2000)Power Couples: Changes in the…Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes (1999)Walrasian Equilibrium with Gr…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingThe college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …Stable Matching in Large Economies (2019)Stable Matching in Large Econ…Strategy-proofness in the Large (2018)Strategy-proofness in the Lar…Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (2018)Marketplaces, Markets, and Ma…Combinatorial Models of Subjective States (2018)Combinatorial Models of Subje…Strategy-proofness in the Large (2017)Strategy-proofness in the Lar…An invitation to market design (2017)An invitation to market designUnbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition (2016)Unbalanced Random Matching Ma…Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (2016)Stability concepts in matchin…Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (2016)Incentive Compatibility of La…Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach (2016)Improving schools through sch…Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching (2016)Contract design and stability…An Empirical Model of the Medical Match (2015)An Empirical Model of the Med…Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (2014)Stability in Large Matching M…Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy (2014)Mechanism Design in Large Gam…Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange (2014)Free riding and participation…Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2012)Stability and Preference Alig…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response (2013)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment (2012)American Economic Review (2019)61. Capitalism and Freedom (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)Philosophy and Public Affairs (2000)Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2001)Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013)The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare (2016)The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare (2019)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The New York City High School Match (2005)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)
this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 2004Putting Auction Theory to Work1,660 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • 2011The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes767 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 1999Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes624 cited
  • 2000Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College Educated, 1940-1990544 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 2008What Have We Learned from Market Design?402 cited

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2007
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
394 cited

Cited by

  • 2016Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition159 cited
  • 2018Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design147 cited
  • 2012Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation147 cited
  • 2015An Empirical Model of the Medical Match121 cited
  • 2014Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange114 cited
  • 2016Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets104 cited
  • 2014Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities100 cited
  • 2016Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching97 cited
  • 2016Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints92 cited
  • 2018Strategy-proofness in the Large86 cited
  • 2019Stable Matching in Large Economies75 cited
  • 2016Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach74 cited
  • 2017An invitation to market design70 cited
  • 2017Strategy-proofness in the Large65 cited
  • 2014Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy39 cited
  • 2018Combinatorial Models of Subjective States5 cited