When Are Juridically Autonomous Agencies Responsive to Elected Officials? A Simulation Based on the Costa Rican Case

Abstract

There has been much study of the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society. This article, however, focuses on autonomy within the state--the ability of elected officials to control the bureaucracy so that it will implement their policy goals even when the relevant agency has juridical autonomy, versus when such agencies can pursue their own policy goals. Juridically autonomous agencies are an important subset of the bureaucracy in most Latin American democracies; thus this subject merits study because of its implications for bureaucratic accountability and the legitimacy of democratic government. Through simulation, using a model of Costa Rican bureaucratic politics, we learn that when elected officials desire a higher level of service production than the agency wants, they are unable to induce the agency to respond and can inadvertently cause it to produce less efficiently. However, when the agency wants to produce more service than elected officials desire, the executive can use the budget to constrain the agency and overall efficiency is enhanced.

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