What determines the level of independence of high courts in presidential democracies? Under what conditions are justices able to make decisions that run against executive preferences in strong Latin American presidencies? This chapter discusses the strategic interplay of high courts with the other branches of government in abstract constitutional review cases. On the basis of the empirical implications derived from a formal theoretical model I develop elsewhere (Rodríguez-Raga 2008), I test the conditions under which the Colombian Constitutional Court defers to the executive in cases related to ordinary legislation or executive decrees. The analysis provides empirical evidence supporting a strategic account of the court's behavior in a separation of powers interaction with the executive. More concretely, the chapter shows that the court's assessment of the political context in which it makes a decision, its anticipation of the executive's reaction to this decision, and the costs associated with such a reaction shape the probability of the court deciding against the government's preferences. The chapter is divided into five sections. First, I briefly review where the Colombian case can be located among the types of constitutional adjudication within the assortment of models in Latin America, based on whether judicial review is concrete or abstract, whether adjudication is made before or after a piece of legislation is implemented, and whether it takes place in a central court or along the entire judicial hierarchy of a nation.
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