POST‐CARTEL PRICING DURING LITIGATION

Joseph E. Harrington

115 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Industrial Economics

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Merger and Competition Analysis Legal and Constitutional Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

Standard methods in the U.S. for calculating antitrust damages in price‐fixing cases are shown to create a strategic incentive for firms to price above the non‐collusive price after the cartel has been dissolved. This results in an overestimate of the but for price and an underestimate of the level of damages. The extent of this upward bias in the but for price is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the more concentrated the industry.

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References

1999Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools 1999Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding 1986A Theory of Exit in Duopoly 2001Antitrust Law, Second Edition 1991Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught 2004Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority 1999A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars 1980Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings

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2006Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection 2014The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel 2014Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

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