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Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
12 references·1 citing·30 second hop
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (2006)Paths to stability for matching markets w…Stable matchings and preferences of couples (2004)Stable matchings and preferen…Random paths to stability in the roommate problem (2003)Random paths to stability in …The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)The Economist as Engineer: Ga…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingRandom Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching (1990)Random Paths to Stability in …NP-complete stable matching problems (1990)NP-complete stable matching p…The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration (2006)Random paths to pairwise stab…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. (1991)Chapter 16 Two-sided matching (1992)Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets (2011)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The New York City High School Match (2005)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)Stable Marriage with Incomplete Lists and Ties (1999)A Survey of the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants (2008)Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)On cores and indivisibility (1974)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 2002The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics1,006 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1990Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching355 cited
  • 1990NP-complete stable matching problems188 cited
  • 2004Stable matchings and preferences of couples131 cited
  • 2003Random paths to stability in the roommate problem111 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration68 cited

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