Belief, some say, is normative. To say this is to say, not only that beliefs are subject to normative standards or principles, but that it is part of the essence of belief to be subject to such norms. Call this view Normativism. Normativism, so characterized, should be distinguished from three related claims. First, that it is part of the concept of belief that it is subject to normative standards or principles. This is not entailed by Normativism, as characterized here. (Compare: it is part of the essence of water, but not part of the concept of water, that water is H2O.) Nonetheless, many normativists accept this further claim. Second, that it is part of what it is to be a belief that it satisfy (or go some way toward satisfying) certain norms. Some make this claim but it is stronger than what we are here calling Normativism, which speaks of subjection not satisfaction. Some opponents of Normativism point out that failure to satisfy candidate norms for belief is widespread (cf. Rey 2007). This might undermine the stronger claim but it does not undermine Normativism as such.
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