Law, Morality, and the Relations of States

Abstract

PrefaceMy aim in this book is to consider the ideas of law, morality,nand society as they pertain to the relations of states. Thesenideas are central and not, as many hold, peripheral to thenstudy of international relations. I want to defend the viewnthat the practices of international law and international moralitynconstitute the indispensable foundation of all durable internationaln association. To the extent that the relations of statesnachieve a significant degree of permanence, rising above thenlevel of mere episodes in the separate histories of isolatednpolitical communities, they must be understood as taking placenon the basis of common, authoritative practices and rules.nAnd this, I shall argue, means that they must be understoodnas occurring within a world of legal and moral ideas.Two topics often treated by theorists of international relationsnare also considered here. One is whether legal and moralnorder can exist at all in an international system lacking centralizedninstitutions for making and applying law and characterizednby deep cultural and ideological differences. The othernis the tension between what might be labeled qstate-centricqnand qcosmopolitanq conceptions of international society, law,nand morality -- an old topic recently revived in controversiesnover human rights and international distributive justice. Butnmy main concern is with an argument that has not been adequatelynconsidered in connection with international relations,nand this is that morality and law are best understoodnas authoritative practices constraining the pursuit of differentnpurposes rather than as instruments for the joint pursuit ofnshared purposes. International morality and international lawnare authoritative practices that have evolved in the course ofnrelations among separate political communities, practices bynwhich international conduct is to be guided and judged. It isnin terms of these practices that those who have different values,ninterests, and beliefs, and who may be engaged in thenpursuit of different and sometimes incompatible purposes, canncoexist with one another. It seems to me that the distinctionnbetween what I have chosen to identify as the qpracticalq andnqpurposiveq conceptions of international society is at least asnilluminating and important as any of the more familiar distinctionsnthat have occupied the attention of theorists of internationalnrelations. This book is largely an exploration ofnthat distinction and its implications.The main distinction is developed in the introductory chapter.nPart One is concerned with the idea of international society,nand in particular with the gradual emergence of thenidea of the society of states as a kind of practical association.nIt considers how the view that international law is an institutionnspecific to the society of states developed from an earliernunderstanding of the law of nations as a branch of naturalnlaw, and explores the historical fortunes of the practical conceptionnof international law in the unfolding of nineteenth andntwentieth-century international politics. Part Two containsnan analysis of the authoritative common practices andnrules of international society, where these are understood asncomprising a system of positive law. And Part Three examinesnthese practices and rules in their moral aspect, that is, as anset of ideas handed down within an independent moral traditionnor traditions. I also attempt to trace some of the implicationsnof the practice/purpose distinction for the topics ofninternational justice, human rights, and the just war. Thenquestion whether the view of international law and internationalnmorality I defend has any relevance to an ideologicallynand culturally diverse world is considered in the concludingnchapter.n n

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