Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Kevin Zollman · Carl T. Bergstrom · Simon M. Huttegger

117 citations0/0 files storedProceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences

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Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation Animal Behavior and Reproduction Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

Abstract

Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.

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1998Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics 1990Biological signals as handicaps 1992Game Theory for Applied Economists 1992Game Theory for Applied Economists 1980A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts 1991Honest signalling: the Philip Sidney game 2001Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language 2000Cheap talk when interests conflict

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