Election Cycles and War

Abstract

Insight into the effect of domestic factors on the international conflict behavior of democratic states can be garnered from treating electoral cycles as cycles in the relative power of state and society. This article shows that there is a discernible relationship between election cycles and the behavior of democratic states in international conflicts. In the past 200 years, democratic states have tended to get into relatively more wars early in the election cycle and fewer wars late in the cycle. Interestingly, this result holds regardless of whether it was a democracy or a nondemocracy which initiated the war. The author argues, however, that this pattern at the international level is insufficient for drawing firm conclusions about the preferences of democratic states and societies at the domestic level. Finally, the author suggests that although election dynamics may mitigate against war entry in the short run, it is plausible that they have made war more likely or more severe in the long run.

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