Induced collaboration in some non-zero-sum games

Abstract

Abstract : Three kinds of 2-person non-zero-sum games were utilized in this study. Two of the games employed a matrix in which the competitive strategy did not dominate in a formal sense whereas the third involved a matrix of the dilemma variety in which the competitive strategy did dominate. In neither of the first 2 games was there any difference in the subjects' collaborative behavior for the 2 experimental conditions. Regardless of condition, however, subjects in these games manifested more collaboration than was true of games of identical matrices where pairs of subjects selected their own strategies. In the dilemma game, there was a pronounced difference between subjects under the 2 conditions - about half of the subjects exposed to the initially competitive stooge manifested collaboration in contrast to an almost complete absence of such behavior in those subjects who played with a collaborative stooge. The latter group played much like subjects playing the same game with other subjects. (Author)

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