Accounts Receivable Management Policy: Theory and Evidence

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain the choice of accounts receivable management policies. The tests focus on both cross‐sectional explanations of policy‐choice determinants, as well as incentives to establish captives. We find size, concentration, and credit standing of the firm's traded debt and commercial paper are each important in explaining the use of factoring, accounts receivable secured debt, captive finance subsidiaries, and general corporate credit. We also offer evidence that captive formation allows more flexible financial contracting. However, we find no evidence that captive formation expropriates bondholder wealth.

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