Article2010

Board Supervision Capability and Information Transparency

99 citations0/0 files storedCorporate Governance An International Review

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Corporate Finance and Governance Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Board members are charged with the responsibility of supervising company operation and firm value cannot only be influenced by managers' actions, but also by those of boards of directors. Furthermore, transparency has always played an important role in corporate governance, but few studies related it to the capacity of boards of directors. Consequently, this study focuses on the capacity, compensation, and structure of boards of directors and how they relate to company transparency. Research Findings/Insights: Using both primary and archival data from Taiwan, we find that compensation can encourage company board of directors to act in the best interests of shareholders when there is greater board independence. Among all board supervision capabilities, continuing education is the most important factor in enhancing the transparency of a firm. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study considers the importance of directors' compensation in corporate governance while the majority of prior studies only consider the role of management compensation. Further, the results provide additional evidence to demonstrate that board supervision capabilities may complement strong governance. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers deeper insights for policy makers to understand the influence of board of directors' impact on corporate governance. In addition, it provides evidence to recommend further consideration of director compensation and continuing education to enhance board effectiveness.

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References

1983Separation of Ownership and Control 1993The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 2001Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature 2002Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 2002The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations 1992The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies 1983Discretionary disclosure

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