Article2003

What's a face worth: Noneconomic factors in game playing

13 citations0/0 files storedBehavioral and Brain Sciences

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract: Where behavior defies economic analysis, one explanation is that individuals consider more than the immediate payoff. We present evidence that noneconomic factors influence behavior. Attractiveness influences offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. Facial resemblance, a cue of relatedness, increases trusting in a two-node trust game. Only by considering the range of possible influences will game-playing behavior be explained.

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1992Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 1958The psychology of interpersonal relations.1985The Evolution of Cooperation 2002Altruistic punishment in humans 1998Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics 1995Journal of the American Statistical Association 2011Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics 1952Social Choice and Individual Values

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