Algorithms for Interdependent Security Games

Michael J. Kearns · Luis E. Ortiz

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Game Theory and Applications Information and Cyber Security Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Inspired by events ranging from 9/11 to the collapse of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen, economists Kunreuther and Heal [5] recently introduced an interesting game-theoretic model for problems of interdependent security (IDS), in which a large number of players must make individual investment decisions related to security — whether physical, financial,

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2013Graphical Models for Game Theory

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2005IDS Models of Airline Security 2007Internalizing externalities of loss prevention through insurance monopoly: an analysis of interdependent risks 2005Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem 2014On influence, stable behavior, and the most influential individuals in networks: A game-theoretic approach 2006On Honesty in Sovereign Information Sharing 2010Existence Theorems and Approximation Algorithms for Generalized Network Security Games 2016Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization 2007A Network Game with Attackers and a Defender

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