Innovation under cap-and-trade programs

Abstract

Policies incentivizing the private sector to reach its innovative potential in "clean" technologies are likely to play a key role in achieving climate stabilization. This article explores the relationship between innovation and cap-and-trade programs (CTPs)--the world's most prominent climate policy instrument--through empirical evidence drawn from successful CTPs for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide control. The article shows that before trading began for these CTPs, analysts overestimated the value of allowances in a pattern suggestive of the frequent a priori overestimation of the compliance costs of regulation. When lower-than-expected allowance prices were observed, in part because of the unexpected range of abatement approaches used in the lead-up to trading, emissions sources chose to bank allowances in significant numbers and reassess abatement approaches going forward. In addition, commercially oriented inventive activity declined for emissions-reducing technologies with a wide range of costs and technical characteristics, dropping from peaks before the establishment of CTPs to nadirs a few years into trading. This finding is consistent with innovators deciding during trading that their research and development investments should be reduced, based on assessments of future market conditions under the relevant CTPs. The article concludes with a discussion of the results and their implications for innovation and climate policy.

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