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Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
16 references·4 citing·42 second hop
Can we rationally learn to coordinate? (1996)Can we rationally learn to coordinate?Weak and strong merging of opinions (1994)Weak and strong merging of op…The Evolution of Conventions (1993)The Evolution of ConventionsSubjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games (1993)Subjective Equilibrium in Rep…Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium (1993)Rational Learning Leads to Na…Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games (1993)Learning, Mutation, and Long …The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge” (1992)The electronic mail game: Str…Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy (1991)Rational Choice: A Survey of …Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (1991)Adaptive and sophisticated le…Rationality, coordination, and convention (1990)Rationality, coordination, an…Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games (1990)Learning How to Cooperate: Op…The foundations of economic method (1983)The foundations of economic m…CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM (1968)CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISMThe Strategy of Conflict (1960)The Strategy of ConflictMethodological Individualism (1960)Methodological IndividualismFact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II (1954)Contributions to the Theory o…Hidden symmetries and focal points (2012)Hidden symmetries and focal p…Salience as an emergent property (2011)Salience as an emergent prope…Minority voting and long-term decisions (2009)Minority voting and long-term…A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory (1998)A spectrum of equilibration p…Convention: A Philosophical Study. (1970)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review (1992)Communication and Coordination in Social Networks (2000)Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications (2013)An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1983)An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. (1983)Evolution and the Theory of Games (1988)On economic applications of evolutionary game theory (1998)Evolutionary game dynamics (2003)The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (2003)The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (1936)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games (1994)A Theory of Focal Points (1995)Social Theory of International Politics (1999)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988)Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay (1990)Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games (1995)Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching (2013)Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Does strategy research need game theory? (1991)On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets (2000)Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse (2009)The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. (1996)Are Emotions Natural Kinds? (2006)Learning by Expanding (2014)Physics and the ‘marginalist revolution’ (1984)The Philosophical Bases of Institutionalist Economics (1987)Methodological Individualism and the Organizational Capabilities Approach (2004)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games (1988)Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010)The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory (1995)Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents (2001)Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates (2001)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)Evolutionary Game Theory (2011)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1960The Strategy of Conflict7,683 cited
  • 1955Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.4,377 cited
  • 1993The Evolution of Conventions2,404 cited
  • 1993Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games2,048 cited
  • 1993Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium699 cited
  • 1992The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”523 cited
  • 1991Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy451 cited
  • 1990Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games378 cited
  • 1991Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games334 cited
  • 1983The foundations of economic method253 cited
  • 1968CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM184 cited
  • 1960Methodological Individualism154 cited
  • 1954Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II149 cited
  • 1993Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games141 cited
  • 1994Weak and strong merging of opinions120 cited
  • 1990Rationality, coordination, and convention94 cited

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  • 2009Minority voting and long-term decisions65 cited
  • 2012Hidden symmetries and focal points44 cited
  • 1998A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory35 cited
  • 2011Salience as an emergent property20 cited