A Realistic Theory of Science.

Abstract

It is the main contention of Cliff Hooker's new book that a realistic theory of science, a theory which gives a good account of what actually goes on in science, should be based on realism. Many readers of this journal may disagree. They may be inclined to the view that a realistic theory of science must attribute a significant social component to scientific knowledge, and would see such a theory as incompatible with realism. I do not, however, believe that these positions are necessarily opposed, for some types of realism are compatible with some sociologies of scientific knowledge. I hope to show that Hooker's brand of realism could be acceptable to some who hold that scientific knowledge has a social component, although it will evidently not be congenial to those who go all the way with Woolgar and Latour and deny that the world 'out there' has anything to do with scientific facts. I A Realistic Theory of Science comprises six chapters reprinted with some minor changes from journals and collections dating from 1974, together with a short introduction and a substantial concluding chapter. For the most part the book is about realism. Five of the six reprinted chapters are more or less directly concerned with realism, while the concluding chapter describes the state of play in 1985 for the evolutionary naturalistic realist this being the sort of realist Hooker is. While Hooker's book is the main subject of this Review, I have also been asked to comment on two other books: John Wisdom's Challengeability in Modern Science and Scientific Controversies, edited by H. Tristram Engelhardt and

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