REITs and Their Management: An Analysis of Organizational Structure, Performance and Management Compensation

Susanne Ethridge Cannon · Stephen C. Vogt

84 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Real Estate Research

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Real estate and construction management

Abstract

This study examines possible agency problems in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) by contrasting the performance, structure and compensation of the two REIT forms from 1987 through 1992. Results show that “self-administered” REITs outperformed “advisor” REITs over the sample period even after adjusting for their greater market risk. Ownership structure significantly influences market performance of advisor REITs; low insider-owned advisor REITs both underperform and take on less market risk than other REITs. Ownership does not affect returns or market risk of self-administered REITs. While advisor compensation and chief executive officer salary appear to be strongly related to size, and chief executive officer salary is related to firm performance, there is only limited evidence that ownership structure affects managerial compensation in either REIT type.

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References

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