Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing Agency Decision Making

Banks P. Miller · Brett W. Curry

15 citations0/0 files storedLaw & Social Inquiry

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Judicial and Constitutional Studies Administrative Law and Governance Legal processes and jurisprudence

Abstract

What role does judicial subject matter expertise play in the review of agency decisions? Using a data set of decisions in which the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) is reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, we investigate this question and find that greater subject matter expertise does make it more likely that a judge will vote to reverse an agency decision.

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References

2005Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses 1990Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 2000Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting 1998Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable 1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control 1981Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study 1986Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study 1986Patents and innovation: an empirical study

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2013Judicial Specialization and Ideological Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals

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