Subject, Body, Place

Abstract

dward Casey's essay stands in a long and distinguished line of phenomenological analyses of human spatiality. Other contributors include Husserl (1970, 1997), Heidegger ([1952] 1971, [1927] 1978), Diirckheim (1932), Lassen (1939), Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962), Bollnow (1963), Golz (1970), Kruse (1974), Waldenfels (1985), Casey himself (1993) and, from just outside phenomenology proper, Strauss (1930), Binswanger (1933), Bachelard ([1958] 1964), and Buttimer (1976). Linking most of these analyses are a cluster of theses, most notably: that self and place are interrelated; that living-lived is central mediating phenomenon between them, and that place and living-lived are distinct from space and physical body. The idea that self and place are mutually constituting is also not foreign to most of these thinkers. In present essay, Casey extends phenomenological legacy, first, by harnessing Bourdieu's ([1980] 1990) notion of habitus to theorize as mediator and, second, by connecting phenomenological conception of horizon to geographical notion of landscape. These are valuable additaments that enrich overall phenomenological approach. The following comments address three aspects of Casey's presentation: conditions that something must fulfill in order to mediate self and place; issues that arise when the body is cited as vehicle of mediation; and contemporary transformations in character of place. I emphasize that my comments are keyed to present essay alone and do not attempt to engage his other (1987, 1993, 1997) considerable and admirable discussions of these topics.

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